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By Muzaffar K. Awan,
Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA
The moment of truth is
fast approaching in Pakistan on May 11, when close to 50 million voters will
elect a new national assembly. The outcome, preceded by a sharp rise in
extremist’s violence, is likely to reverberate far and wide.
Pakistan’s post 9/11,
poorly planned and hurried, participation in war on terror and its homegrown
terrorist groups know very well by now that the country is on the verge of a
real change, and they are attacking candidates and voters who according to their
choice favor a soft secular democratic state rather than a radical theocratic
state. Hundreds of people have already been killed, and more will undoubtedly
die before the Election Day, being targeted because, if they prevail, they would
push for what is commonly called the founding father’s idea of Pakistan to its
logical – and Islamo-democratically balanced conclusion.
About seven decades ago,
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, launched the movement to create
an independent state for the Muslims of British India. The British colonial
administration finally acquiesced, creating a country out of Muslim-majority
areas. The population of what is now Pakistan was about two-thirds Muslim; the
remainder were mostly Hindus, Sikhs and other minorities.
That demography had
changed dramatically with the partition of the new states of India and Pakistan
in 1947, when close to 15 million people moved across the newly drawn borders.
About 9 million Muslim refugees fled India and entered Pakistan, and about six
million Hindus and Sikhs moved in the opposite direction entered India. By the
time this unfortunate “ethnic cleansing” was over, Pakistan’s population was 95%
Muslim.
Over time, a proportion
of this population (with sectarian orientation) began to demand the creation of
an “Islamic state” in the areas that were now Pakistan. In the upcoming election
the same sectarian groups (never a majority) would like to take the country
along that uncharted course.
Pakistan is not the only
Muslim country seeking to redefine its political and economic future, but
similar processes have also been playing out in other countries of the Islamic
world. By contrast, far Eastern Muslim countries like Indonesia and Malaysia
have already succeeded in establishing political pluralistic orders that serve
all segments of highly diverse populations reasonably well. That is bound to
eventually happen in the rest of Islamic world as well, only after ongoing
struggles for true democracy presently occurring in Pakistan and MENA (Middle
East and North Africa) succeed.
The large countries in a
part of the Islamic world – most notably Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey – have been
attempting to address these issues, the most challenging of which is redefining
Islam’s role in the modern day political system. Turkey is actually way ahead of
other two and truly owes its Islamo-democratic homeostasis to the softening and
reconciliation of Ataturk’s hard (laic) secular tradition, brought about by men
such as Adnan Menderes in the ’ 1960s, Turgut Ozal in the ’1980s and in the last
decade Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current prime minister of Turkey. Faith based
civil societal transformational (not faith-based politics) Hizmet movement in
Turkey has been contributing effectively over the decades and is presently
seizing worldwide attention.
Turkey also seemed to
have found an answer, prodded in part by its wish to join the European Union. A
conservative ruling political party with deep religious convictions is content
to have religion as a personal and collective observance in public sphere, with
no direct influence on State policy. This issue of reinterpretation of true
Islam in politics remains chaotic in Libya, Yemen and Syria .It is the least
talked about in Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, and still less settled in Egypt
and Tunis thus far. In Pakistan a small but highly motivated part of the
population (with Wahhabi / Salafi mindset) has embraced religious extremism and
violence as a form of political expression.
Political science
literature in Turkish, Indonesian and true Islamic context argues that via
electoral participation, radical, extremist (Islamist and secularist) and even
anti-system political ultranationalist or Islamist parties do eventually
moderate their agendas in order to benefit from opportunities created by a
pluralist democracy. The opportunities provided by the pluralist truly Islamic
tradition and the democratic experience of Turkey from Ottoman times to present
has helped Turkish Islamists and secularist to transform their ideologies into
post-Islamism and post-secularism. Thanks to these pluralist experiences,
Turkish /Indonesian Islamists have not only participated in elections, competed
for voters, and even democratically came to power but have also discursively and
physically interacted with various secularists, Muslim groups, intellectuals,
scholars, businessmen, communities and so on, in a pluralist setting. As a
result, Turkish/Indonesian Islamists/secularists have been able to modify their
ideologies in tune with pluralist and democratic ideals. Other Muslim nations
can and would learn important lessons from these experiences to achieve their
own democratic ideals without necessarily copying exactly the Turkish or
Indonesian models.
The role of the military
in politics also needed to be resolved. Once again, Turkey and Indonesia have
taken the lead in this context also; while in both Egypt and Pakistan, the men
in uniform have presently returned to their barracks, but they have not yet lost
their influence over public policy.
The sectarianism and
violence in Pakistan that was restricted early on to Sunni-Shia-Ahmedi and has
taken on a new dimension as other than the Ahmedi and Shia, now the Barelvi sect
(Sufi saint mausoleums and Eid Milad un-Nabi) is also being targeted while
religious scholars (the ulema), who have passed injunctions against suicide
bombings have been killed irrespective of their schools of thought. Since 2001,
a total of over 2,600 citizens have been killed while over 6,000 have been
injured in sectarian violence alone, triple the casualty figure of 1989-2000.
The sectarianism may also be exacerbated by the outcomes in Syria. If Sunnis
triumph there, they could become more assertive in countries that have large
Shia populations. It is not often recognized that Pakistan has the world’s
second-largest Shia population, after Iran, with roughly 50 million adherents.
They have been mercilessly attacked in Karachi and Quetta in recent years, with
more than 400 killed.
An urgent change in
Strategic Depth policy is essential for Pakistan’s internal stability at this
point in time. While Pakistan Army as an institution is skilled in the
comprehensions of international relations, as it forgoes its ideological
partners when faced with a territorial threat; It closes down and reforms
sections of the ISI when faced with internal threat and insubordination; still
it fails to realize that its strategic policy framework is certainly flawed and
badly hurting the country. An important factor in this regard is the civil
military power imbalance and a lack of trust between the two institutions. The
army has managed the Afghan and Kashmir policy since Zia’s time leading to a
lack of rethinking and reassessment for the last 30 years, as policy change is
primarily an outcome of pluralism, opposition and peaceful transfer of power,
the beauty of true democracy. It is also perfectly understandable for a military
institution to be strategically trained in a zero sum game with its archenemy,
but for that to be unchallenged State policy for decades is anathema to growth
and progress of any nation. This can be judged from the fact that all
democratically elected leaders over the last 30 years have either extended or
accepted peace overtures towards India and Zardari’s foreign policy agenda too
included peace with India, no Taliban safe havens in Pakistan and good and
mutual-interest relationship with America. But the civil political leadership
has yet to gain the confidence of the powerful security establishment and lacks
the institutional strength to forcefully make a case for policy change, thus the
strategic policy role stays still with the military.
As the end game in
Afghanistan is nearing, Pakistan would be well advised to understand that the
root of its current predicament lies in its undefined borders in the West and
East and thus its leverage should be used towards these ends. Although Pakistan
is in a strong position to gain strategic space in Afghanistan, the Pakistan
military should understand that this leverage is an outcome of excessive
internal costs and its unaccountability. Pakistan should not confuse this
short-term leverage with long-term influence, which is dependent on internal
strength and strong diplomatic relations based on mutual interests.
For this, Pakistan would
need to bury the Strategic Depth policy framework to explore and exercise the
following set of policy options: First, make a clean break from using
ideological non-state actors for its policy objectives. Second, enhance its
diplomatic relations (in the region, Muslim nations, US, and China), which were
built on the foundations of security arrangements with security agenda usually
trumping economic interests, to encompass a broader development focus.
Third, Pakistan
desperately needs to put its internal chaotic house in order and to that end
seeking peace with India, which is involved in proxy wars with Pakistan and can
exploit its internal troubles, would be a desirable goal. Finally, Pakistan
needs to evolve a comprehensive counter terrorism and extremism strategy,
foremost being integration of FATA with the rest of the country and
strengthening its public institutions to create the 2 million yearly jobs
required for its current demographics.
This demands a paradigm
shift and a new military doctrine, which is not possible with a war in its own
neighborhood that has caused over ten thousand civilian and over four thousand
security agencies fatalities while displacing several million of people from
their homes. Pakistan continues and could leverage in Afghanistan in strategic
terms, however, time is running out and it has already lost the entire and the
very 1st decade of the 21st century with about $43bn as the cumulative cost of
war to the economy and additionally reduced public services spending (due to
higher spending on security) leading to Pakistan most likely and unfortunately
missing out on its Millennium Development Goals targets to 2015. Thus there is a
growing realization in Pakistan that a continuation of war in Afghanistan does
not at all serve its national interests and well being.
On the other hand
America has yet to come up with a regional solution to allay Pakistan’s security
concerns vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. It is pushing ahead with combat troop
withdrawal date to 2014 buying itself more time. Pakistan still has time and
opportunity to re-strategize and devise an innovative policy towards Afghanistan
combing regional and bilateral approach, whereby Afghanistan and India are seen
as part of the solution to dismantle and disrupt terrorism in the region and
have stake in peace and sustainable development of the entire region. Such a
vision demands broader internal consensus, which implies that the civilian
government and the Pakistan Army must act in absolute unison and concert,
supplementing and supporting each other fully and pursing shared goals through
permanently abandoning the flawed, failed and nationally injurious policy of
Strategic Depth.
Finally, there is the
question of the Muslim word’s relations with the West, particular the United
States. The old post-Ottoman “grand bargain” – Western acceptance of
authoritarianism in exchange for the secure flow of oil, use of sensitive
sea-lanes, and some tolerance for the existence of Israel – has already broken
down. The shape of the new political order that finally emerges in the western
and Islamic world will determine what replaces it. In other words, more is at
stake in Pakistan’s upcoming election than just the future of Pakistan.
There is growing
recognition, some of it grudging, that the coalition led by the Pakistan
People’s Party has managed to create a political structure built on some stable
foundations. This is an accomplishment in a country that was on a political
roller coaster for most of its history and the army had ruled Pakistan for a
total of 33 years (where crises of much lesser intensity had consistently
brought the military rushing onto the political stage, as happened in military
coups of 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999) since independence in 1947. This time
(despite crises of much higher intensity) the soldiers have remained in their
barracks, for the simple reason that an awakened populace, an active civil
society, and a free and vibrant media would not tolerate another venture into
politics by the army. After five years of democratic rule, Pakistan is on its
way to establishing a durable and representative political order. While it has
not produced clean and efficient government and the coalition proved unable to
translate political success into strong economic performance. There seems to be
considerable comfort in the popular belief that, by working together, Pakistanis
will eventually find a way out of the mess in which the country finds itself.
For the last five years,
Pakistan’s annual GDP growth has averaged just 3% – half the rate needed to
absorb two million new labor-force entrants every year. If growth does not pick
up, the ranks of the unemployed and underemployed will swell, increasing the
size of the pool from which extremist groups find fresh recruits.
The upcoming election
has both nurtured hope and generated anxiety among Pakistanis. It could go
either way. And, for good or bad, where Pakistan goes some other Muslim
countries could follow.