By
Muzaffar K. Awan, Grand Rapids Michigan, USA
Similar to
other Islamists in the several parts of the Muslim world, Pakistani Islamists
have also used intolerant and exclusivist rhetoric. They have abused religion in
a heavy-handed manner as the dominating tool of their political ideology and
have confined religious concepts and values to certain parties and groups,
nationalizing, modernizing, Islamizing and politicizing them. Pakistani
Islamists have also envisaged taking over the state and using it to socially
engineer a top-down Islamist transformation in society through state centralism
and or militarism.
Three
issues have been central to Pakistan's political development over the decades:
first, Islam and Islamist's relationship to the state, second, democracy and
third, civil-military relationship. These issues have been separate and yet
interdependent, as they have unfolded in tandem with shaping Pakistan's politics
and its civil society. In the 1980s, Islamists supported the military's drive
for power and suppression of the democratic forces. Since 1988, the military,
Islamist forces, and democratic parties have cooperated and competed with one
another, seeking power and position in defining the rules of the game. The
complexity of the interactions between the three actors during the decade of
civilian rule (1988-99) precluded the institutionalization of democracy and
facilitated the return of the military to power in 1999. General Pervez
Musharraf's regime had also been no exception to this trend. Its secular
military rule proved untenable and had to rely on Islamist forces to manage
civilian-military relations.
The case
of Pakistan has been instructive in what it reveals about the changing role of
Islamic factors in determining the balance of power between civil-military
relations, and how democracy -Islam - military-state relationships – are to
influence one another, deciding how Pakistani politics will unfold from this
point forward.
With
Pakistan’s track record of assassinations, military coups, corruption
allegations and much more, leading the way to Pakistan’s nascent and shaky
democracy defying every prediction, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), having
come to power in February 2008, has by hook or crook managed to complete a full
five- year term in office. This is still history making in the continuation of
this feeble democratic process and says something about a country that for more
than half of its existence has been ruled by the military. It has endured
national affairs through sham democracy even in times of civilian rule. No
previously elected government in Pakistan’s history ever survived five year
term. Indeed, some of the PPP government’s accomplishments, despite all the
flaws, are noteworthy. To give it some credit, the government did take several
steps to institutionalize democracy. Notably, it brought in amendments to
cleanse military interventions in the constitution, reducing the powers of the
president, restoring the executive supremacy of the prime minister, and gave the
provinces more power. In the case of Pakistan’s relationship to India, there
have been small but positive indications of improvements due to the recent
relaxation of visa regulations and trade agreements. But as the country prepares
for the upcoming elections on May 11, the PPP, having spent most of its term
looking over its own shoulders to safeguard itself from imagined and real
threats, has little else to show off on governance.
Militarism
and militancy represented as a mindset that has bred since the earliest days
after the creation of Pakistan (starting with President Ayub Khan, continued by
Yahya Khan, Zia-al-Haq and most recently Musharraf). The Islamist’s success in
instituting many assumptions in popular political culture and framing key
debates in an Islamist frame of reference eventually weakened the grip of
secular politics in Pakistan, contributing first to the fall of the Ayub Khan
regime (1958-69), the tragic conflict that led to the creation of Bangladesh as
a separate nation in 1971, and ultimately to the collapse of Prime Minister
Zulfiqar AIi Bhutto's experiment with socialism (1971-1977). The Islamist vision
became somewhat more secure in the state during the Zia ul Haq era (1977-88).
This period witnessed further the Islamization of laws, public policy, and
popular culture, producing a unique case of systematic propagation of
Islamism. The Zia regime embraced the Islamist vision of state and society and
used it not only to shore up state power by ending its war of attrition with
Islamism, but also to expand its own powers domestically as well as regionally.
The Mullah-Military alliance provided even further legitimacy to military rule
which justified its suppression of democratic forces by claiming to build a
so-called Islamic order. The alliance between Islamism and military rule
produced temporary stability, but was ultimately fraught with too many
inconsistencies and divergent interests of its key actors to survive.
In August
1988, within months of dissolution of assemblies by Zia ul Haq, the
ultraconservative ruler died in a mysterious plane crash. It also ended the
formal alliance between Islamists and the state. With the autocratic Islamo-military
ruler gone, a new hope for democracy’s revival sprang among politicians who were
either waiting on the sidelines in self-exile or were barred from contesting
election. With the return of democracy and the growing power of civilian
politics the military and Islamists confronted diverse and divergent interests
in a changing political scene. Since 1988 Islamists, politicians, and generals
had sought to manage relations between Islam and the state. The continuous
negotiations, debates, and confrontations between them had changed the nature of
both Islamism and Pakistani politics.
Then
onwards, it had seemed like a game of musical chairs between Prime Ministers
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Both their governments could not complete the
stipulated five-year terms, after being ousted on allegations of corruption,
deteriorating law and order and a host of other reasons.
In the1988
election, the PPP gained 94 seats out of the 207 and Benazir Bhutto became
Pakistan’s first female prime minister. However, the euphoria was short-lived as
her government was ousted in 1990 by the then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on
charges of corruption and failure to maintain law and order.
In 1990, a
general election was held again and an Islamic Democratic Alliance Party,
headed by Nawaz Sharif, emerged victorious. Nawaz Sharif became the prime
minister, but he resigned in 1993 in the wake of a power struggle between
himself and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.
Another
election was held in October 1993 that saw Benazir Bhutto making an other
comeback despite allegations that her government faced dismissal over corruption
charges leveled against her and her husband Asif Ali Zardari. Strife in the
Sindh province, a stand off with the Supreme Court, and the death of Benazir
Bhutto’s brother Murtaza Bhutto in a ‘police encounter’ also factored in to the
dismissal of her government by President Farooq Leghari. Murtaza Bhutto’s
controversial death benefited Nawaz Sharif in the election later held in 1997 as
it had turned public opinion against Benazir Bhutto her husband.
However,
Nawaz Sharif could not stay much longer in power after his conflicts with the
Supreme Court and the military became public knowledge. After dismissing
Jahangir Karamat
from the position of the army chief and installing Pervez Musharraf in the
former’s stead in 1998, Sharif also had a falling out with the latter that
staged a coup and took on power in October 1999.
Pervez
Musharraf took on the position of the country’s president in 2001. He initially
seemed “progressive” by analysts. Thereafter, Musharraf agreed to partake in
the U.S. war on terror without rational and constructive discussions (that
eventually and unfortunately also became Pakistan’s war on terror). With the
poor handling of mutual interests and ties between the United States and
Pakistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Musharraf’s reputation
began to take a nosedive.
Musharraf
also became highly unpopular in the latter part of his dictatorial rule. The
killing of Akbar Bugti in 2006, the sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry,
the Red Mosque incident and the imposition of emergency in the country in
November 2007 all marked the end of his dictatorial rule. Rising unrest in the
country and the lawyers’ movement to reinstate the deposed judges turned public
opinion increasingly against him.
The
country’s media, which had seen significance progress in the first few years of
Musharraf’s rule, experienced a number of instances where their freedom was
curbed. Moreover, during the same time, Benazir Bhutto made a comeback with
speculations regarding a
deal with Musharraf.
Later, Nawaz Sharif also joined her in hopes of making a coalition government
with the PPP. Bhutto’s return to Pakistan was marked by a botched assassination
attempt on her life. In spite of these life threatening attacks, she held a
number of public meetings where she spoke on the lack of security in the middle
of apparent threats to her life.
However,
the former two times Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who many considered charming
and popular despite the corruption allegations, was assassinated in December
2007. Her death sent shock waves across the nation and pressures further
heightened on Musharraf, who subsequently held the 2008 general elections.
In the
wake of Bhutto assassination, the PPP swept the largest number of seats in the
National Assembly and brought in the then recently-widowed Asif Ali Zardari as
the party’s co-chairman. Yusuf Raza Gilani took oath as the prime minister in an
emotionally charged session of the National Assembly and Zardari later took
office as the country’s president.
President
Asif Ali Zardari’s early reluctance to reinstate judges sacked by his military
predecessor Pervez Musharraf ensured that when Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary
was eventually restored, the government was already locked in a debilitating
battle with the Supreme Court, giving rise to damaging news that the judiciary
was a proxy for the army. The government’s attempts to reclaim foreign policy
from the military sent its relations with the United States on a roller coaster
ride, while ties with India plunged further after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and
still desperately needed to recover fully.
Pakistan’s economy has been in shambles, in large part due to flawed policies
not only over the last five-years but also over the decades, and also owing to
the terrible security climate and the over-all uncertainty in the country. The
government has unsuccessful in shaking off its reputation for corruption. And
it was simply beyond its capacity to rein in militant groups — born out of the
military’s pact with Islamist extremists — that have ferociously turned inward
on Pakistan’s own citizens.
The army
has been living down the U.S. killing of Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan.
However, if there was no coup, it could have been because the country has
undergone so much chaos that the military would rather let politicians take all
the blame for it. The PPP could, with its own justifications (and even
correctly), accuse the Musharraf military regime for its failures. After the
country’s first democratic transition —for which the humiliated Musharraf has
oddly enough but boldly returned from self exile wanting to participate in the
upcoming elections - the weight of people’s expectations will fall squarely on
the next government after the May election. The political party or group that
comes to power will have to deliver, or risk damaging Pakistan’s tiny roots of
democracy.
Civil-Military
Relationship Imbalance in Pakistan
There is
no clear sign that any concerted efforts are underway to change that ingrained
military mindset in the near future. For decades, psychological war tools have
been deployed repeatedly in civil-military relations, in U.S.-Pakistani
relations and in dealing with internal policy critics. All this has become worse
since the time of Zia-ul-Haq, post 9/11 and to the present. The story presently
makes many Pakistani intellectuals; the US think tanks and the Western officials
discuss a needed new doctrine instead of continuing to dwell on pressures about
the continued presence of non-state actors in Pakistan.
Following
9/11, and even most recently, Pakistan’s military leaders have used public
relations and media as a substitute for actual policy change. Taking the example
of Osama bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan, and instead of ever seriously
checking out that possibility, General Pervez Musharraf and his colleagues
simply used media stories to suggest that bin Laden was either dead or sick or
in Afghanistan, as if that would solve the problem.
To begin
with, the U.S. and Musharraf jointly made blunders and a wrong deal with each
other back in 2001 following 9/11. Having pressured Musharraf on a phone call,
"You are either with us or against us," made him accept (without any rational
discussions and/or strategic mutual planning) all the seven points, set before
him as demands, by
Colin Powell.
This was the start of a disaster for the world that in retrospect amazes all
logical thinkers and has been criticized since in Pakistan and the West. The
U.S. basically gave away everything to Musharraf (disbursing billions of dollars
in various forms of aid over the past decade for poor level of support they
received in return.) as a military dictator of Pakistan. [1]
The
Pakistani military half-heartedly participated in a war against terrorism, being
quite uncooperative when it came to Afghanistan since Pakistan has had its own
strategic military interests in Afghanistan which have not been compatible with
U.S. Interests. In fact, the Taliban resurges would not have been possible
without the explicit Pakistani support.
Pakistan
had gotten military hardware and elevated Pakistan to the status of a close
American ally in the war against terror while the outcomes have not been
satisfactory for the U.S. and for Pakistan. To this day, militants are ruling
parts of northwest frontier province of Pakistan while the Afghan Taliban still
control almost all of the Afghan territory except Kabul. Despite the unwarranted
bloodshed of innocent victims and ongoing economic strife, the Pakistani
military has not been able to accomplish much in terms of gaining control
against the Pakistani Taliban and their supporters.
However,
post 9/11 and politically, Musharraf had strengthened his own dictatorial
control of Pakistan and strengthened the military hardware. The U.S. had
provided him with the funds for the security fight. Musharraf became
politically, militarily and personally power-drunk as a dictator bringing about
the destruction of political institutions in Pakistan; taking leading
politicians and sending them to exile, and then ripping their political parties
apart, violating the constitution of Pakistan and gaining self-centered
advantages in the political process. He repeatedly broke the law without any one
stopping him from damaging Pakistan’s evolving political structures. Ultimately,
the Pakistanis themselves stood up to him bringing his downfall.
When Chief
of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani took over as the army chief in late
2007, he seemed to understand the need for a change. Some even believed that the
end of 2008 completed his new military doctrine. From the surface, the
appearance of change may have seemed as a positive development but it was
clearly not enough as it turned out later on.
To the
serving and most retired military generals, India still remains the eternal
enemy and “cutting India down to size” with the help of non-state actors remains
a viable strategy for Pakistan even if the people of Pakistan have had it and
would like to live in peace and harmony with all their neighbors including
India. In any case, the media story regarding the change in doctrine was planted
in the view of many. The military’s own intellectuals later had denied any
change. The Pakistani military ever looking away from India is still a bit
nonsensical.
The
military planted such a story in the media to denote one opinion within the
army. We do hope, however, that sooner than later the army would learn as to
what can and should be done in the real world of today as opposed to what they
would like to do or have continued to do. Unlearning past clichés for the
military is difficult but it certainly needs to be done for Pakistan’s own sake
at this point in time.
Pakistan
definitely needs to change its doctrine of military superiority within the
Pakistani civil society and state. Until that happens, any change in the
military doctrine will be insufficient and ineffective in changing the country’s
direction and road to internal and regional peace. The military has the right to
give views; opinions and inputs but the nation must determine its own priorities
as a whole. Pakistan has been falling terribly behind in education. Its economy
is underperforming and has reached the lowest ebb. The entrenched terror and
conflicts of which Pakistan has become a part and parcel of are largely
responsible for this unbearable and chaotic situation. Hyper-nationalist
rhetoric, often preached by the military, must give way to rational discourse
about serious issues and solving of serious problems. The military must
understand the benefits of creating a partnership with the people and giving
them ownership of national writ, security and sovereignty.
Underperforming Pakistani politicians have been a problem in a civil society
that has been turning apolitical and Pakistan has still a powerful military.
Unless politicians improve their performance, the military will remain dominant
and supreme. However, democratic transition has been very weak and slow. It
will take time to gain public supremacy. A civil-military genuine dialogue
between the serving military generals, retired military officials, the
civilians, politicians and intellectuals is a must with the army avoiding to
infiltrate the civilian [participants] through its agents. The dialogue should
take place confidentially while out of the media’s sight.
The
general headquarters’ psychological war operatives are making it impossible for
civilians to create national consensus against non-state actors when these
non-state actors are now increasingly becoming an existential threat to Pakistan
itself have often supported Islamist and hyper-nationalist elements within the
media.
The
military has a pool of its own retired officials who are intellectuals. The
military is bound to grapple with serious problems at home and the region. It
urgently needs to enter into a new and peaceful relationship with India. It is
no longer enough to do old things more efficiently; the rules of the military’s
games have changed in the region. The army needs to rethink many of the larger
strategic issues — allowing trade with India to move really ahead was certainly
a dramatic step in the right direction. The Pakistan’s military, however, needs
to do a lot more and very soon for national/regional reconciliation and peace
making.
A new
military doctrine must stem from the process of defining national interests. The
society and the parliament, not the military alone, must redefine those
interests. The army still considers itself the sole arbiter of national
interest. The debate must shift from just how can the process of setting the
military priorities right be launched, given the fact that the parliaments have
almost always had been failing to stand up to the military on security,
strategic and foreign policy issues. Civilian leadership in setting strategic
priorities is still a long way off. The military’s hegemony of the realm of
discussion and debate must change. Criticism of the army’s decisions is not and
should not be construed as opposition to the institution of the army. The
national debate on foreign policy and the way it is conducted must change before
civilians can assert themselves. The problem we have is that there are too many
instruments of intimidation against those who simply seek to redefine national
interests from within the government.
In
Pakistan, the process has been short circuited for a very long time. Certain
meaningless beliefs have been created. Anyone saying we do not need to install a
pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan but rather stay as friends with whichever
regime is in power [in that country] is immediately branded as an anti-Pakistan
activity. There has been little room for diversity of opinions about the U.S.
and India .The nationalist discourse glorifies some terrorists, insisting that
they be only called militants, and those who want to oppose all terrorists are
often oddly and strangely described as foreign agents.
This
manner of discussion and labeling must end for genuine and logical discussions
and for real civilian supremacy to develop and prevail. The military has a
respected place in the nation but it cannot be the only respected institution.
It doesn’t help when the military goes around castigating anyone who questions
its own formula as anti-Pakistani. The parliament must realize this and must
take the bull by the horn. Theoretically, no military force has voluntarily
surrendered its power or allowed constructive debates thus far.
Turkish and
Indonesian Experience from Military Rule to
Democracy
How did
Turkey and Indonesia overcome their own civil-military imbalance? How can we
replicate that in Pakistan and other democratizing Muslim nations? It took
Turkey many decades to overcome the civil-military relationship imbalance. Faith
based civil societal transformation (not faith-based politics) in Turkey has
been increasingly seizing worldwide attention. How do we see Islam in Turkey
today?
What
are our Turkish brethren pleased with, and what are they worried about? Of
course no nation is politically or democratically perfect. Turkey still has
problems of its own within its own politics and culture. Yet it is only fair to
say that the Turkish Republic and public sphere has had a much healthier
interaction and experience with democracy in the Islamic cultural context. Many
Turkish folks and outsiders (like Musharraf and his like-minded military and
autocratic predecessors) would readily say that Turkey owed all this change to
Ataturk and his ultra-secularist and nationalist reforms. But, Turkish masses
today and many intellectuals like Mustafa Akyol (author of a brilliant and
recent book) [2] argue that they in Turkey actually and truly owe its Islamo-democratic
homeostasis to the softening and reconciliation of Ataturk’s hard secular
tradition, brought about by men such as Adnan Menderes of the’ 1960s, Turgut
Ozal of the ’1980s and presently Erdogan, the prime minister of Turkey over the
last decade.
The
mainstream Islamic view in Turkey today is at peace with the secular (soft) (not
the secularist-hard) state, and how this came to be is a curious and interesting
story that Mustafa Akyol clearly related in his book[2]. Nursi and Gulen
faith-based movements over the decades have also contributed indeed by
transforming the Turkish civil society in parallel with Islam-democratic
homeostasis rooted in Ottoman later years and the works of the Muslim scholars
and politicians named here.
The
military in Turkey, to begin with, has had a different relationship with its
people. It had initially promoted the Turkish ultranationalist ideology.
After 1983, the Turkish military created a new constitution and new parties.
Even then, for close to two decades the military’s meddling in politics
continued .The generals used courts to disband the Refah Party. Later on, it was
obliged by the European Union to support and strengthen democracy and pluralism
in order for Turkey to be accepted by it.
Recep
Tayyip Erdogan organized the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and patiently
neutralized every attempted political adventure by military one-by-one, which
helped Turkey’s democratization process tremendously over the last decade. The
major parties had also agreed that they would deal with one another and not cut
deals with the military. It has been a gradual process; and something similar
might yet happen in Pakistan, Egypt and other Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
nations in the near future and in the blowing winds of change.
Political
science literature in Turkish and Islamic context argues that via electoral
participation, radical, extremist (Islamist and secularist) and even anti-system
political ultranationalist or Islamist parties do eventually moderate their
agendas in order to benefit from opportunities created by a pluralist democracy.
This writing argues that the opportunities provided by the pluralist tradition
and the democratic experience of Turkey from Ottoman times to present has helped
Turkish Islamists and secularist transform their ideologies into post-Islamism
and post-secularism. Thanks to these pluralist experiences,
Turkish
Islamists have not only participated in elections, competed for voters, and even
democratically came to power but have also discursively and physically
interacted with various secularists, Muslim groups, intellectuals, scholars,
businessmen, communities and so on, in a pluralist setting. As a result, Turkish
Islamists/secularists have been able to modify their ideologies in tune with
pluralist and democratic ideals. Other Muslim nations can and would learn
important lessons from Turkish experience to achieve their own democratic ideals
without necessarily copying exactly the Turkish model.
During
the first five years since the 1998 fall of Indonesia’s President Suharto after
32 years, Indonesia has had three presidents— Bacharuddin Yusuf Habibie (from
1998–99), Abdurrahman Wahid (from 1999 to 2001), and Megawati Sukarnoputri (from
2001–04) —all of them took power by democratic means. The people of Indonesia
have enjoyed freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of information, checks
and balances between the executive and legislative branches of government, and a
depoliticized military.
The
military, in Indonesia had then decided to let its influence be handled through
retired generals in the political sphere, thereby isolating the serving officers
from the politics. The election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (a retired general)
as a president came about in the eventual culmination of that process by 2004.
This could too serve as an example for Pakistan and other Muslims countries.
In
Indonesia, in the military context, it was also mainly after the Asian financial
meltdowns that the military had to further surrender its power. Furthermore,
Islam-democratic homeostasis culminated in Indonesia through the works of
enlightened Muslim intellectuals like Ahmad Syafii Maarif (born 1935), Nurcholish
Madjid (1939-2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009) also a politician and
president from 1999 to 2001.
The debate
between two earliest Indonesian leaders Kusno Sukarno (1901-70) and Muhammad
Natsir (1908-93) was the classic example of the disagreement between secularists
and Islamists over various issues regarding religion and politics early on in
Indonesia. “Sharia for Muslims” in Indonesia was the words originally in
the Indonesian constitution, but following the protests by a Christian
delegation, in August 1945, the Preparatory Committee of Independence removed
them. Throughout recent Indonesian history, Islamists had been struggling to
return those words back to the constitution. They tried during the Sukarno
times, but failed. They had also tried in the Suharto times, but it was just
impossible to do so as his regime did not allow any talk about political Islam.
There have
been indeed conciliatory changes in the political mindset of Indonesian Muslims
over the decades. Partly due to the external factors that were boosted by
secular-militaristic regime under Suharto and partly due to internal factors,
which were pushed by liberal Muslims intellectuals themselves, and the way they
constructively perceived democracy and plurality in the Islamic context. The
opportunity for Islamists had just come once again to reinsert those words again
into the constitution when Indonesia became a democratic country after Suharto’s
fall in 1998. They had put their hopes in the 1999 general election but still it
never happened.
To begin
with, Indonesia, since Sukarno’s era, had been a state based on an Indonesian
national ideology and philosophy called “Pancasila” (Five Principles). These
five principles were: (1) Belief in one supreme God or monotheism; (2) Just and
civilized humanism; (3) The Unity of Indonesia; (4) Democracy; and (5) Social
Justice.
Living
harmoniously in the religiously pluralistic Indonesia had only become possible,
when two conditions were met: (1) Pancasila as state ideology was
whole-heartedly accepted and supported by the Indonesian Muslims, the largest
religious groups in the country; and (2) Indonesia as a country was governed
democratically. Thanks to the Reformation Movement (Gerakan Reformasi) that
had brought an end to Suharto’s dictatorship in May 1998, the two conditions had
begun to be met again in the post-Suharto Indonesia. There is no stronger
indication of this than the rejection by the majority of Muslim politicians in
the newly and democratically-elected People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR) of the “Syari`ah amendment” in 2002. Although
some politicians who came from Islam-based political parties supported the
amendment, they only constituted about 15% minority of the total membership of
MPR. In Indonesia’s history, this was the first and the most democratic decision
in which Indonesian people (including majority of Muslim politicians in the
People’s Consultative Assembly fully and heartedly) accepted Pancasila as a
state ideology and rejected the Jakarta Charter for the state to implement
Islamic law and become “Islamic State”.
This
happened because of the changes that had been taking place over the many decades
in Muslim intellectual thought and practice in Indonesia providing further
Islamic justification for the acceptance of pluralistic and democratic Pancasila.
Through
lectures, writings, and actions, the three most enlightened and influential
Muslim thinkers and reformers in Indonesian contemporary history advocated
liberal democracy and delegitimized Islamist political parties. Unlike in Egypt
and other Middle Eastern countries, but very much like Gulen and Nursi movements
that too had begun in Turkey earlier, the Indonesian reform movements have
always been through large organizations. Intellectuals such as Abdurrahman Wahid
(1940-2009), Ahmad Syafii Maarif (born 1935) and Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005)
were Muslim leaders who chaired these large organizations. They spread their
liberal and pluralistic ideas to Muslim society through these organizations.
Wahid did it through Nahdlatul Ulama (40 million members), Maarif through
Muhammadiyah (30 million members), and Madjid through Islamic Student
Association and its alumnae (over 10 million members).
Madjid
developed his support for the modern ideas of equality, tolerance, pluralism,
consensus, opposition, and popular sovereignty from Islamic doctrines and
traditions. He argued that any ideas developed by Muslims that contradicted
these modern social and political ideas should be subjected to historical
criticism. By taking this approach and stating it publicly, coupled by his being
an effective writer and orator, he became an important agent of Islamic cultural
change among his contemporaries. He had been, for several decades, a major force
in developing a modern Islamic discourse and political practice in Indonesia.
Madjid
rejected the idea of Islamic theocratic state. He argued that for many Muslims,
Pancasila is, from the Qur’anic perspective, a common term (kalimah sawâ’)
between different religious people that God commands to seek and find. He quoted
a verse from the Qur’an (3: 64) addressed to the Prophet Muhammad: “Say: O
people of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: that we worship
none but God; that we associate no partners with Him; that we erect not, from
among ourselves, lords and patrons, other than God….”Thus the principle of
monotheism, for Madjid, is the common term of all divinely inspired religions.
But he quickly added that the adherents of different religions could also agree
to a set of common terms that included more values than one of monotheism alone.
“And the more values that the adherents of different religions could agree upon
as common terms, the better it should be,” he wrote. This means, to have five
subjects as common terms between different religions or factions, such as with
Pancasila for Indonesian people, is better than to have just one subject. In
that way Pancasila became the firm basis for the development of interfaith
dialogue, tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia. Madjid was known for his
secularization motto, “Islam, Yes, Islamic party, no,” which meant that Muslims
did not have to support any political party using Islamic name or symbols.
Madjid
ideas found cordial support from his close colleague Abdurrahman Wahid (1940
–2009), another major agent of the modernization of Muslim thought and political
culture in Indonesia. In fact, given his background and social status, Wahid’s
agency has perhaps been even more decisive than that of Madjid’s. A grandson of
the founder of NU Hasyim Asy'ari, (The NU- Nahdlatul Ulama founded in 1925 has
been for decades one of the largest independent faith-based social but
non-political movement in Indonesia. The estimates of its membership range are
as high as 40 million or higher. NU has been acting as a charitable and socially
transforming movement, helping to fill in many of the shortcomings of the
Indonesian government in the civil society; it has been funding schools,
hospitals, and organized communities into more coherent civic groups in order to
help combat poverty and ignorance) and a son of Wahid Hasyim, the long-term NU
Chairman. In 1984,
Abdurrahman Wahid,
inherited the leadership of NU from his father, and he was later elected
President of Indonesia
in 1999.
In
addition to his own intellectual Islamic thought and teachings, Wahid had also
been known for his close attention to Western intellectual, civilizational and
artistic tradition. Although he was less inclined than Madjid in anchoring his
ideas in Islamic teachings and tradition, his voice strongly resonated in and
was widely accepted in NU circles, importantly because of his social standing.
For
decades, Wahid’s major concern had been with plurality and tolerance in the
context of the modern Indonesian nation-state. He argued that in order for
Indonesia to be a modern nation-state, and for the sake of the public interest
it and the core values of Islamic teachings; every citizen in the country must
be treated equally regardless of his or her religious affiliation. Since
Indonesia is a religiously plural nation, in which Islam is only one among many
other religions, then treating someone as a second-class citizen simply because
he or she is non-Muslim was entirely intolerable. For this reason, Wahid had
argued, putting Islam and other religions as complementary, not antagonistic,
was necessary for the sake of the public interest. He also believed that Islam
could indeed thrive spiritually in the Indonesian multicultural state that is
not formally based on Islam. He wrote, “NU adheres to a conception of such
multicultural nation state that was in accordance with the Pancasila and the
Constitution of 1945.”NU had become the pioneer in ideological affairs. This has
been the case even though throughout the entire Islamic world there is still a
problem between nationalism and Islam. All the Saudi writers consider
nationalism a form of secularism. They do not yet comprehend that nationalism
such as in Indonesia was not hard-core secularist, but rather soft secular
that respected the role of religion. During the New Order (Suharto) period,
Wahid’s idea of an inclusive Islam led him to support Pancasila as the sole
foundation of Indonesian politics. And under his leadership, NU was the first
major faith-based social movement and organization that had accepted Pancasila
as the final state ideology. Moreover, NU declared that Pancasila is its
organizational foundation, a decision that had a powerful effect on NU’s role in
national politics. Among others, under his leadership, NU withdrew from partisan
politics and declined its support for PPP, an Islam-based political party. And
in 1984, NU returned to the 1926 khittah (“the guideline of 1926,” the year it
was born), meaning that it became once again a purely social and faith based
movement, but not a political movement. Under this principle, as if echoing
Madjid’s secularization motto, the members of NU were free to participate and
vote for any political party, regardless of its religious affiliation. Since
then, NU members can be found in many parties, Islamic and secular, including
the NU-based PKB political party that had rejected the “Syari`ah amendment” in
2002.
What many
Islamophobes around the world were relieved about was the fact that Indonesia,
not unlike Turkey, did not descend into an exclusivist Islamic state. Pakistan,
Egypt, Tunisia and the Muslim world as a whole too in my view will not be
endangered or destined for any theocracy ever.
Arab Spring
uprisings and lessons
The Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region, since December 2010, has been facing some
of the dilemmas that other societies had to deal with during their own processes
of political transition. These included the conundrum of how to move from the
authoritarian regime breakdown to democratic reform, the division between
liberals and conservatives, civil-military relations and a weak and fragmented
opposition.
Current
reform challenges in the post-revolution Arab world are connected to a long
trajectory of transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracies in Southern
Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. Drawing lessons from the
past democratization experiences could provide a better understanding of current
events in the MENA region, and help Arab policymakers to better face the
challenges of democratic institution-building.
Drawing
from past experiences may also help external actors like the European Union, the
United States and international organizations avoid past blunders. Faced with
rapidly changing situations in the Middle East, what can policy makers learn
from past efforts to support reform in these countries? Which policies have
worked, which challenges Americans always overlooked, and what best practices
can be identified?
Of course,
Americans always admit that freedom and democracy was not the province of one
people or culture, but a universal right. And yet America’s misplaced caution,
hedging of bets, and fetish for gradualism—previously the hallmarks of
hardheaded realpolitik—proved both foolhardy and naïve in MENA. Also, to
extremists’ dismay, real change does not come through force, violence or terror.
It even doesn’t necessarily come through social movements alone.
The United
States and the West has had a checkered, tragic history in the MENA and other
Muslim regions. For decades, the U.S. and the Europeans have been unfortunately
on the wrong side of history, supporting and funding Arab/Muslim
autocrats/dictators and undermining nascent democratic movements when they
seemed to threaten American/Western interests. So critics of Western meddling
and interference have always had a point. Whenever the U.S. and Europe
interfered in these regions, they seemed to get it wrong. That is precisely why
it’s so important that, this time around, they better getting it right. But
getting it right requires that the West fundamentally reassess its own Middle
East policy, be an honest broker and align itself fairly with Arab/Muslim/Jewish
populations and their democratic aspirations. This has not quite happened yet.
Arabs/Muslims kept on waiting and are still waiting for America to change its
policy and at least divest itself of Arab and Muslim world dictatorships. This
is something that even Obama had promised in his 2009 Cairo speech but still
failed to deliver. It still did not happen. So they themselves had to initiate
the process of change. Arabs discovered a revolutionary power they did not know
they had. These revolutions, as others in the recent past, told a story of
strength, security and safety in numbers. In so doing, they powerfully started
impacting the U.S. to rethink its over six decades of failing policy in the
Middle East and the Muslim nations.
These
revolutions are far from being complete. A great deal is at stake. Egypt and
Tunisia, despite all their problems, remain the most promising cases. Elsewhere,
the situation is considerably graver. Thus far, the Obama administration has
been behind the curve in nearly every country, reacting to rather than shaping
events. President Obama adopted a slow and deliberate approach, and refused to
take a stronger stand with America’s Yemeni and Gulf allies. Even enemies such
as the Syrian regime have so far escaped any real pressure. If anything is
clear, it is that Arabs have shown that something more than caution and
gradualism is called for in historic moments of change. This time, they–not the
international community–are leading the way. But they and their countries need
the international community to follow and support. Otherwise, their revolutions
may still fail.
America
was rightly credited for helping facilitate transitions in many Eastern European
and Latin American countries. The international factors now and in the future
will be even more relevant. International pressure from masses of the world or
governments still propelled by public and social media played a critical role in
undermining support for the dictatorial regimes that just months earlier were
thought by many to be not vulnerable. If the U.S. is seen as helping make
another transition possible, this time in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere in MENA,
it will give Americans much needed credibility in the region. Successful
transitions could herald a reimagined relationship between the U.S. and the
Arab/Muslim world.
As the
MENA region struggles to shift from autocratic to democratic governance, a
number of elements influence how well the democratization process may progress.
In all countries involved, an inclusive constitution that represents a broad
societal consensus is essential to the sustainability of the transition process.
While transitions must strike a balance between stability and decentralization
of power, a concentration of powers in the same hands paired with a lack of
effective checks and balances – even if proclaimed temporary as recently in
Egypt – is almost certainly detrimental to democratic development. In this
regard, examples of transitions across the globe have demonstrated that
parliamentary and judicial oversight over the executive is a precondition for
the accountability and public scrutiny needed to gradually re-establish the
public’s faith in government institutions. The return of powers into the hands
of elected representatives, including the de-politicization of civil-military
relations and the establishment of civilian control over the national security
forces and foreign policy, is essential. That said evolution might happen in a
gradual but systematic manner in order to avoid a collapse of state institutions
and ensure security during the fragile transition period. In order to reduce the
spoiler potential of the ‘losers’ of transitions, inclusion of all ethnic,
religious and political groups (including former regime stalwarts, within the
margins allowed by transitional justice) is key for the emergence of a peaceful
and sustainable democratic consensus of society.
Lessons
learned from both successful and failed transition processes also provide a
number of guiding principles for external actors seeking to support democratic
development in the MENA region. First, they must resist the temptation to pick
political favorites. Second, they must refrain from promoting ready-made
solutions, and instead allow local actors to take ownership of reform efforts
and priorities in an inclusive manner. Third, because transitions are long-term
and non-linear processes, donors must take a long view and avoid short-term
support and involvements. Due to pressure to show results, external actors often
focus on rapid results and shift policy directions according to the prevailing
and current political climate. In Ukraine for example, donors had switched
support from civil society to government when reformists came to power, but the
government proved unable to implement many of the reforms it was committed to.
With external support missing, civil society was weakened. In contrast,
generous, long-term external financial and technical support to Central and
Eastern Europe during the two decades post-1989 facilitated the implementation
of politically unpopular but much-needed structural reforms. Fourth, top-down or
insensible external involvement can negatively impact the legitimacy of domestic
actors and make them vulnerable to accusations of supporting undue foreign
interference.
Islamo-Democratic
Homeostasis
When
properly understood, Islam is certainly compatible with and positively conducive
to democratic pluralism, religious tolerance, and respect for human rights all
being integral part of basic Islamic values. Islam as it actually exists
presently around the world sadly exhibits the very opposite of true foundational
values and qualities. Distorted Islam has to be dismissed, as ossified and
false since authentic Islam has been hijacked by radical minority. Enlightened
and true Islamic intellectuals and scholars in the 21st century propose nothing
short of rediscovery of Islamic foundational principles as they originated and
were practiced in the days of the Prophe Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) and the
earlier Islamic history. They are determined to reinterpret it, reconstruct it,
and make it compatible to the present century. The basis for this rediscovery
and reinterpretation lies in the Quranic scripture and the practical model of
the prophetic State of Medina that was exemplified by Islamo-democratic
homeostasis through the Rashida period. Through a meticulous sifting of the
Quranic exegetical materials, both classical and contemporary, numerous scholars
believe, hold the tremendous potential of revealing possibilities of
reinterpretations. Only through such a creative re-appropriation—one that
revives the original pluralism of Quran in early Islam—will it become possible
for Islam to be inclusive in the modern world once again.
This is,
to put it mildly, an ambitious project, requiring considerable erudition but
also considerable courage against the falsehood so prevalent. Of particular
note, it is a project that the scholars have undertaken as much on behalf of the
West as on behalf of the Muslim world itself providing the sole and
coherent worldview of holistic Islam—for only through Islam can even the West
resolve the contradictions with which it finds itself beset-among world belief
systems and cultures. When it comes to the West’s relations with the Muslim
world, there need be no “clash of civilizations.”
It is not
a fundamental principle of civilizations that they stay stuck in a state of
clash with each other. Neither is it a fundamental principle to end history with
one system over all other concepts. Mankind is witnessing the painful rebirth of
a new geopolitical and social order in which other, non-Western and rising
civilizations are certainly required to come to the fore: Chinese, Indian,
Islamic, and Euro-Asian, Russian etc.
Islam must
consequently serve as the only vital external perspective on the modern
project of a soft secular world order. It is, indeed, the only thoroughly
religious critique of the international public order with its secularist and
liberal presuppositions as Islam stands out as the only monotheistic
tradition that can help deepen the West’s self–understanding in its liberal
project of international interest and order.
This is,
without any doubt, a huge claim and—to a believer who is not a Muslim— sort of a
putt off. Still, in the aftermath of September 11, with the United States
engaged in a war on terror that is more accurately a war against militancy,
radicalism, distorted religions and any plausible argument that holds out the
prospect of a more benign alternative that merits respectful consideration. Its
methodology is akin to that of a legal brief. In marshaling evidence in support
of true belief, these scholars invite attention to specific and carefully
selected scriptural understandings, some of them apparently ambiguous on their
face value, explain how, if correctly deciphered, they actually testify to a
(once) pluralistic and most tolerant faith-Islam. Anticipating the arguments of
skeptics, they cite numerous reinterpretations, seemingly unambiguous in
expressing illiberal sentiments, and explain how their actual meaning is other
than what had been misinterpreted. An important point here is the contention
that the Quran accepts pluralism as given, and even required basing this
contention on the passage of Qur’an that states:
“The
people on this planet as a whole were one community (umma); then the Creator
sent forth all the Prophets, with good tidings to bear and the warning, and He
sent down with each prophet the Book, that he might decide the people touching
on their differences”
(Al-Baqarah 2:213).
The concept of community
as a universal (global) civil society and democracy, the Islamic notion of
all of humanity as one community, recognition of differences between people,
principles concerning human morality and integrity are among numerous other
concepts that could certainly be transmitted into the universalizing
civilization of today. The reinterpretation of these concepts is crystal clear
today. The concept of Community based on Quran [2:13] explained here
is universal to begin with ‚ is glocalizable in today’s times where people
are becoming citizens of one world, sharing the same destiny, and facing similar
problems. They are in reality members of the same human community. Thus,
the Umma of Islam (Ummat al–Islâmiyya) is integral part of the
Umma of humankind (Ummat al–Insâniyya). Another fact is that Islam is
alien to racism, teaching universality and equality among all human
beings. As quoted by Arnold Toynbee, “The
extinction of race consciousness as between Muslims is one of the outstanding
achievements of Islam, and in the contemporary world there is, as it happens, a
crying need for the propagation of this Islamic virtue.’’[3] Thus over fourteen
centuries and on a world scale, Islamic civilization has provided various
societies, otherwise divided along the class, ethnicity, tribe, clan, or race,
with a common platform upon which to negotiate and stabilize patterns of
mutual/pluralistic coexistence.
In the
citation above that introduces this Qur’anic chapter
(Al-Baqarah 2:213), three facts emerge, the unity of humankind under One Creator
(Tawhid); the particular and different religions brought by the prophets; and
the role of scripture (the Book) in resolving the differences that touch
communities of faith. All three are fundamental to the Qur’anic conception of
religious plurality. On the one hand, it does not deny the specificity of
various religions and the contradictions that might exist among them in matters
touching on correct belief and practices; on the other; it emphasizes the need
to recognize the oneness of humanity in creation and to work toward better
understanding among peoples of faith.
In the
modern age, however, traditional Islamic law, whose functions included
constraining arbitrary power, failed to update itself, and had been gradually
rendered ineffective via "modernization." As Noah Feldman
illustrated
brilliantly, this process had produced not the liberal democracy of Islam or the
West, but various secular (and sometimes fiercely secularist) autocrats
-- such as the Atatürk of Turkey, Reza Shah of Iran, or the Nasser of Egypt
amongst many others.
Islamism,
the totalitarian ideology that had aspired for an "Islamic state," was more of a
reaction to the modern crisis, rather than a direct continuation of the Islamic
democratic and pluralistic tradition. It was also based on an importation of the
worst and westoxicating harmful ideas of the West. One of the founders of the
Islamist ideology, Pakistani Islamic scholar Sayyid Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, had
openly acknowledged that his "Islamic state" would "bear a kind of resemblance
to the Fascist and Communist states," in the way it would dominate the whole
society.
One of the
troubling questions about Pakistan had been Mawdudi’s follower Zia ul Haq, an
Islamist and a military dictator’s attempt to synthesize Islam with
totalitarianism, while the enlightened Muslim scholars had wanted to bring about
homeostasis between liberal public democracy, Quranic and traditional teachings.
The future
of MENA and other slowly but surely democratizing Muslim nations today do not
seem as grim as some had suspected (at one time due to the negative impact of
Maududism and Qutabism), as many enlightened scholars argue in the most
constructive details in more recent times, and as explained in a recent book, “Islam
without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty”
by Mustafa Akyol. [2]
With
ongoing deeper intellectual discussions among Islamic centrists and even
political parties show positive signs. Turkey's incumbent Justice and
Development Party, Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and Ennahda
of Tunisia have played very important roles, by showing that pious Muslims can
well be a part of the democratic process and gain from it. Interestingly,
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of Egypt, political Party stemming from Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt, the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood party of Syria and
Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami party in Pakistan seem to have and continue to take
important lessons from the Turkish, Indonesian examples, and are getting slowly
but surely transformed from the radical and oppressive groups to moderate and
relatively liberal ones.
Even if
some of these political Islamic groups still seem to believe in an “Islamic
state” and will have tendencies to impose an “Islamic way of life” on their
respective societies like Egypt, Pakistan or MENA. The problem with that is not
just authoritarianism. It is also that whoever imposes Islam (that is against
the foundational teachings of Islam) via the state or any institution will be
imposing the “Islam” that he or she understands. However, since no Muslim or any
other denominational school of thought can claim an ultimate access to exclusive
truth, the state must remain neutral when it comes to religious matters. Whether
Jamaat-Islami of Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and their
counterparts in other Arab countries will be humble enough to see that is the
next big question. Will Arab Spring and democratic transition in Muslim nations
make things better or worse? As for the Arab Spring/Muslim states in transition,
many of us are of course very supportive of it, for it is toppling or
challenging the dictators who oppressed Arab /Muslim societies for decades under
the false pretext of Islamic extremes taking over. Presently, we are keeping our
fingers crossed for the fall of the Baath tyranny in Syria. But democracies—let
alone liberal democracies—do not emerge overnight, and the post-revolutionary
countries and even Pakistan will need some time and lots of effort to build
them.
To be
sure, a probable transformation of the Muslim mind from authoritarianism to
liberalism still remains a very challenging process, which would still face many
obstacles. As was indeed the political evolution of
Christianity
that had historically been equally difficult. It certainly took a lot of effort
to move from the Spanish Inquisition and the "divine right of kings" to the
liberating motto of Benjamin Franklin, "Rebellion to tyrants is obedience to
God." Islam, many believe, is just no less capable of going through the same
distance and the process rooted in its origins.
The most
significant issues facing Muslims in the 21st century is the necessity to reopen
the doors of religious interpretation—to re-examine and correct false
interpretations, replace outdated laws and formulate new doctrines that respond
to changing social contexts. Always using the Quran as a yardstick, the book
demonstrates how and why Islamic law came to reflect political and social
influences, leading to regulations that violate the spirit and the letter of the
Quran. It analyzes critically Muslim teachings on issues of pluralism, civil
society, war and peace, violence and self-sacrifice, the status and role of
women, non-Muslims, and even capital punishment.
As
referred to here, the writings and works of Turkish scholars Mustafa Akyol,
Budiuzzaman Nursi, Fetullah Gulen, Indonesian scholars, Ahmad Syafii Maarif
(born 1935) Nurcholish Madjid, and Abdurrahman Wahid, the Egyptian Wassatteya
intellectual group (Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and
Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa), and Tunisian Scholar Rachid Ghanouchi are all profound
and thought provoking in this context. Pakistani intellectual and scholar
Tahir-ul-Qadri (like the Egyptian Wassatteya intellectual group) has had very
similar ideas that have begun recently to impact Pakistani politics and will
be equally applicable/beneficial to Pakistan’s own present crisis and other
Muslim nations including MENA. A Genuine Islamic scholarship, with deep
understanding and background in Islamic Sharia resource and Western law, and
their broader intellectual ideas as a global public intellectuals, activists,
writers and thinkers of international repute and standing; they are all
destined, in my opinion, to facilitate Islamo-democratic homeostasis in
Pakistan, MENA and beyond.
Many have
argued Pakistan’s and MENA experiences are deeply important and relate to the
south Asian region, the Middle East, the Islamic and the rest of the world. In
this context, whether or not one agrees with the intellectual thought that
deserves to be more widely understood and applied, —for us all in the Muslim
world today, not unlike Turkish and Indonesian intellectual history; Islam,
democracy and liberty are not merely reconcilable, but—well reconciled on
foundational basis, as we can compare and see the Islamic democratic roots in
the city state of Medina, Ottoman Tanzimat and most recent Turkish and
Indonesian examples and the evolving democratic effort presently ongoing in
Pakistan and MENA.
The
insights of these intellectuals into the problems of freedom in Islam
individually and collectively argue that Islam, at its very core, has been a
religion that has been liberating the individual from the bond of the tribe and
similar collective bodies. They also show how the initial impetus of the faith
was partly overshadowed as a result of some early theological controversies, and
some political historical decisions of the past meaning that some of those early
debates could be reopened, and coercive elements in Islamic law and culture be
reframed and reformed. All this is within their individual and collective
interpretations that are very similar though little known or talked about
history of liberty and freedom in Islam that had reemerged in the late Ottoman
Empire, amongst modern-day Turkish - Indonesian scholars and those named from
Egypt, Tunisia and Pakistan in recent times.
Multiple
and revealing writings in this context are available for both Muslims and
non-Muslims who firmly believe that Islam and liberal democracy are
fundamentally incompatible. Obviously, we can now in thought and practice show
them clearly that a genuinely Islamic yet liberal worldview is certainly
available based on these multiple interpretations and writings mentioned here
and in practical examples (of Turkey and Indonesia). Muslims can even tolerate
“freedom to sin,” for example, not because they condone sin, but simply because
the judgment about personal sin should be left to the Creator.
Liberty in
Islam, based on the interpretations of scholars and intellectuals named here, is
certainly also a political and economic system, which limits the powers of the
state or head of the state, and gives individuals, and their voluntary
associations, freedom to shape their own destinies. They all certainly believe
that liberty has been an Islamic value system throughout Islamic history,
while liberalism became a full-fledged ideology in the West in the modern times,
and modern state had threatened freedoms in unprecedented levels at times. Many
Muslim scholars also think today, as always, that liberty presented the best
medium for Muslims to live Islam in the various ways (not monolithic) that they
had always understood.
It is true
that most interpretations of Islam place a strong emphasis on the social, the
communal, often above the individual ---and if we stress the liberty of the
individual from larger collectives, does Islam play any role in the greater
social questions of our times? Should Islam also speak to the intermediary
institutions, between state power and individual life, to temper that power and
protect the individual?
Of course
Islam does have a strong sense of the community and, that collective sense
implies a strong basis for civil society and its ongoing transformation, which
is of course very important for empowering and protecting the individual in the
face of threats coming from the modern state. However, Rachid Ghanouchi and
numerous other scholars believe that the Qur'an, with its strong emphasis on
the individual’s personal freedom of conscience and deeds [The Qur’an itself
champions this sentiment, emphatically declaring: “There shall be no compulsion
in religion” (2:256)], presented a more individualistic worldview than many
Muslims ever appreciated. These intellectuals and many others actually believe
that the individuality in Qur'an was gradually overshadowed by a more
communitarian mindset that shaped Islam in its formative centuries. They
explored such differences between the Qur’anic and the post-Qur'anic tradition,
and that is how they came to be insightful, in their own writings.
Of course,
Muslims not unlike most other cultures don’t tolerate some sins— like murder,
cheating, lying in many circumstances. Are there sins that we must object to
socially? And if it were not a matter of state power, should Muslims still
condemn sins? This is a great question—and that is something Akyol discusses in
his book chapter, named “The Freedom to Sin.” There, he has suggested a
distinction between sin and crime. Sins are acts of personal disobedience to the
Creator, like drinking alcohol or refraining from daily prayers and other
obligatory rituals of Islam. But crimes are acts that hurt others, like murder
or theft. Most crimes are also sins, but most scholars say that not all sins
should be considered crimes. And they say that by looking at what Qur'an really
penalizes and what it does not.
The
overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims already reject extremism, terrorism
and authoritarianism that remain contrary to Islamic teachings, law and culture.
But not all of them tend to agree when it comes to the issues such as apostasy,
blasphemy, and sin due to different interpretations of Islam.
A secular
(soft) state is neutral to religion, and respects religious practices (including
Sharia in Muslim culture) in public sphere unless they cause harm to individuals
and society. A secularist (hard) state, however, bears an ideological hostility
to religion, and wants to radically secularize society by banning all religious
practices or institutions. Most communist dictatorships of the past century were
indeed radical secularist states. Kemalist Turkey, too, had been a secularist
(laic) state—which banned the headscarf, Sufi orders, or religious education—and
it gave a bad name to secularity among the world’s Muslims. Luckily, though,
that hard-core secularism of Turkey has been tamed down and defanged to great
extent in the recent years.
We can
elaborate on this distinction between secular and secularist. In places like
Egypt, and potentially Libya and Yemen as well, democracy will throw forward
explicitly Islamist parties, however much some of them might want to deny it
(although Islamist doesn’t mean authoritarian). Do we think these parties can
contribute to building democratic societies in the Islamic world? Is it possible
to build post-secular states, neutral between religion and secularism?
“Islamist”
does not mean authoritarian, even if it implies a political party that is
inspired by Islamic principles and values, but articulates them within the rules
of liberal democracy. The closest and also recent example to that seems to be
Ennahda in Tunisia /Wassat party in Egypt, and we are very hopeful about their
future based on the thought and works of Rashid Ghanouchi in Tunisia and the
Egyptian Wassateya intellectual group behind the Egypt’s Wassat Party.
For the
last several decades an influential group of Egyptian scholars and public
intellectuals has had a profound impact on Egypt and the Islamic world (beyond
Maududi/Qutbian ideology). There remains an impressive portrait of these New
Islamists--Islamic scholars, lawyers, judges, and journalists who have provided
the moral and intellectual foundations for a more fully realized Islamic
community, open to the world and with full rights of active citizenship for
women and non-Muslims.
The New
Islamists have a record of constructive engagement in Egyptian public life,
balanced by an unequivocal critique of the excesses of Islamist extremists. The
New Islamists are translating their thinking into action in education and the
arts, economics and social life, politics and foreign relations despite being in
the middle of the authoritarian political environment. For the first time, we
can hear in this context the most important New Islamist voices, including
Muhammad al Ghazzaly, Kamal Abul Magd, Muhammad Selim al Awa, Fahmy Huwaidy,
Tareq al Bishry, and Yusuf al Qaradawy--regarded by some as the most influential
Islamic scholar in the world today. A potentially transformative force in local
and global Islam, the New Islamists define Islam as a civilization that engages
others and searches for common ground through pluralistic shared values such as
justice, peace, human rights, and democracy. This is indeed an impressive
achievement that contributes to the true understanding of Islam in general and
the possibilities of a centrist Islamist politics in particular.
The
Egyptian group of Islamist writers and thinkers named above that has constituted
a kind of emerging consensus about Islamic constitutionalism and its
relationship to democracy. The main focus of some intellectual circles in the
West (Bruce K. Rutherford and Raymond William Baker)[4-a] and the Islamic world
in this context has been the work of the thinkers like Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Tariq
al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa. Critically, these
circles argue that Islamic constitutionalists favor constraints on state power,
which, while derived from Muslim resources compared to liberal Western
constitutionalism, are nevertheless very much democratic in nature. Even if
grounded in sharia resource, Islamic constitutionalists nevertheless
affirm that governance is “a prime arena for the development of man-made law”.
Through shura, or consultation, Islamic constitutionalists certainly
favor a political system with multiple political parties and a parliament that
rules on matters unclear in sharia. These theorists also believe that the state
is a “moral actor” that should achieve justice through ongoing social
transformation.
The state
imagined by liberal constitutionalists and Islamic constitutionalists would
share many of the same institutional features, but that an Islamic
constitutional state would be “far more emphatic than that found in Western
liberal regimes”. Only rare and important limitations (hadud) prescribed by
Quran would be placed on women and men both, as well as on limitless freedom in
any realm. This civil state would nevertheless govern democratically according
to Islamic culture without any anti-democratic goals or secret authoritarian
impulses. This is a welcome change, making treatment of Islamic
constitutionalism very valuable indeed for scholars of the region as well as for
the students.
The
statist conception of constitutionalism stands in stark contrast to both liberal
constitutionalism and Islamic constitutionalism. It was sought by dictators in
the Muslim world to eliminate political competition. However, the statist
conception of law and constitutionalism does not appear to receive the same
meticulous treatment as the liberal and Islamic constitutional perspectives of
today.
Most
people appear to accept, without much criticism, the claims that liberal and
Islamic constitutionalism — and strengthening of an independent private sector —
will ultimately lead to democracy in Egypt and MENA. The necessity of developing
small and medium-sized enterprises with keen interest in invigorating the
electoral system, in order to use electoral politics as a means to gain greater
influence over the development of policy.
Much the
same could be said of reliance on political science thought and findings about
the proper sequencing of liberal Islam and democracy and the benefits of
structural-adjustment programs.
While
liberty does lead to democracy, the actual evidence linking private-sector
development with democratization is somewhat mixed due to uncertain relationship
between the state and the private sector. In MENA indeed this uncertainty still
exists and has been the topic of some debate. Thus far in MENA, there simply are
not enough enterprises and that, therefore, “The private sector has not yet
become an advocate of democratic reform”. The longstanding narrative at the
public sector in MENA has been unproductive and thus serious cutbacks were made.
Since then, MENA has not made great economic gains. Again, this is so, but there
is a debate to be had and the very successful example of Anatolian Tigers
(Islamic economic/capital) [4-b] needs to be studied.
There is
simply no other contemporary work on constitutionalism in MENA with remotely the
same level of depth as the centrist and Ennahda movement thought. Like all
believers, the Islamic believers’ main purpose is the same like that of all
other Abrahamic monotheisms, “To make humans aware of their Creator and His
intentions.” In other words, it is primarily about connecting God and man. Of
course, God, through the Qur'an like other scriptures, gives man some rules and
principles that will guide his behavior to other men as well—that is where
canonical law including Islamic law in human history came from. But we also
think that this law, in its divine origin, is intentionally limited and
flexible, for times and social structures always change and laws should adapt to
that change. What keeps us affiliated with Islamic belief? Well, its main
purpose: we believe that we have a Creator, and Islam is one of the paths that
we in Islam know to connect us with the Creator.
For all
Muslims to study, in addition to the above named scholars, I would certainly
suggest a good translation of and commentary to the Qur'an–Risale-Nur by Nursi
(his emphasis on “freedom” that is also little known outside of Turkey) and also
‘reconstruction of Islamic thought’ by Muhammad Iqbal. Then a good book on the
history of Islamic thought, which would expose the students to all the different
colors of Islamic faith that has evolved in the past fourteen centuries
.Finally, the Bible (old and new testaments) should be added to the curriculum.
The Qur'an repeatedly refers to it, and it is a pity that we Muslims have taken
very little notice of that.
Conclusions:
The
ultimate goal for Pakistan is to be a balanced, stable, and secure internally
and regionally. War on terror including domestic struggles in Pakistan must end
permanently. Af-Pak has been the scene not only of the Soviet-Afghan war, War
on Terror, but also of longstanding Afghan-Pakistani disputes, the
India-Pakistan conflict, domestic struggles in Pakistan, US-Iranian antagonism,
Russian and Chinese concerns about NATO, Sunni-Shia rivalry, and struggles over
regional energy infrastructure. It will not only require political settlement
within Afghanistan-Pakistan but also a regional grand settlement.
Pakistan’s
economy has to be seriously addressed otherwise the outcomes will not be
positive ones. However, good governance is a clear pre-requisite for achieving
economic growth. The divisive challenges of provincialism and nationalism,
including the division of the federation are to be dealt with and through
preferably non-military solutions, mutual dialogue and reconciliation inclusive
of the situation in both Baluchistan and FATA that will lead to positive
outcomes.
Pakistan
continues to face a tough and serious set of challenges again and again. It
appears to be teetering on the brink of major change. As often in the past, the
pessimists have predicted fragmentation, meltdown, and descent into irreversible
chaos and a failed state. But so far, this has not happened as “muddling
through” has repeatedly been more the order of the day than any really radical
change in a positive or negative direction; and the status quo has prevailed
despite dismemberment of its eastern wing in 1971 and ongoing present chaos.
However,
the current volatile situation of a failing economy; the growing gap between the
rich and poor; lack of robust governance which actually filters down to the
level of the masses; increased radicalization of mindsets; the geopolitical
circumstances of the country’s neighbors, combined with an apparent lack of a
strategic approach to addressing the bigger picture, means that the coming
several months and upcoming May 11, elections could subsequently see Pakistan
facing a scenario of something completely different internally and better
than ever in the region “from great game to great gain”.[5] Just how that might
play out, remains to be seen.
Pakistan
has endured a cycle of alternating democratic and military rule since
independence. A stable democracy has proved elusive due to the strength of
Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies, religious parties’ support of the
military at the expense of democracy, a compliant judiciary, weak and
patrimonial political parties, and Western support for Pakistan’s dictatorships.
In 2007
and 2008, a mass movement of political parties and civil society succeeded in
ousting General Pervez Musharraf, opening the way for a consolidation of
democracy in Pakistan. The movement’s success can be credited to a number of
factors: a unified coalition of political parties and civil society with the
common goal of defending the judiciary’s independence; strong leadership from
the lawyers and the judiciary itself; the return of influential political
leaders from exile; the existence of private media that could contest the
official version of events, promote an alternative narrative, and mobilize
supporters; and an agreement between Pakistan’s key political leaders on a
charter of democracy setting out a plan for Pakistan’s governance after the end
of military rule.
Since
Musharraf’s ousting, however, several obstacles have re-emerged to consolidating
democracy. Despite the military’s own admission of shortcomings in developing
intelligence on the presence of Osama bin Laden, the military and intelligence
agencies appear to be tightly guarding their control of defense and foreign
policy and operating in other areas of civilian jurisdiction. There is friction
between the government and judiciary as they work out the balance of power
between them, tension among the political parties as they negotiate the
coalition government, a slow pace of reforming parliamentary and party
practices, and weak participation by civil society, allegations of corruption,
which plagued past civilian and military regimes, keep resurfacing.
To build
on the move toward democracy begun by the mass movement of 2007 and 2008, the
civilian government should assert authority over the military and intelligence
agencies, civil society and the greater public active participation in creating
a robust legislative agenda to address the key issues Pakistan faces, and
investigate and prosecute corruption. Transforming old political parties and new
political parties should be trained and strengthened in the genuine democratic
practices. Civil society and the media should likewise be made more effective
watchdogs and advocates for true societal reformation. For its part, the
international community can become more engaged in strengthening democratic
practices in government and civil society through expanded consultations and
assistance and by maintaining long-term support for particularly effective
civilian institutions and organizations.
Regardless
of the outcomes of Pakistan’s upcoming elections in 2013, the country and its
rulers will continue to face a number of critical challenges. Addressing the
issues of poor management of energy supply and inefficient public sector
enterprises could yield economic dividends. However, unless they are supported
by improved governance, their benefits will be limited or absent.
Overall,
governance issues can be characterized as the repeated failure to regard the
people of Pakistan as citizens, rather than clients of a patron state.
Furthermore, recent promising constitutional and legislative amendments have yet
to be translated into implementation on the ground that is meaningful to the
common citizen.
The
question of achieving permanent peace with India through the achievement of
internal civil-military relationship balance leading to maximizing the
opportunities inherent in the potential opening up of trade with India, beyond
the short term alone, and prevent the hawks on both sides of the border from
weakening trade agreements to prevent them reaching their full potential
presents both an opportunity and a challenge. Taking small steps with confidence
building could be the slogan capturing the recent gestures towards peaceful
relations between India and Pakistan. A slow shift towards a relationship
building on economic opportunity rather than security threats is epitomized by
thinking in small steps that may avoid negative or chaotic outcomes. This sure
but gradual approach offers a considerable promise and an open window of
opportunity for building peace and harmony between two nuclear-armed nations.
There have
been small but positive indicators of improvements due to recent relaxation of
visa regulations and trade agreements likely to benefit Pakistan’s weak economy
more than that of India. Acting small, thinking big could mean positive
bilateral outcomes for unresolved but serious problems between India and
Pakistan, including Kashmir. For Pakistan’s political leadership, peace with
India remains an existential issue.
As Khaled
Ahmed beautifully put it, “After more than a decade of resistance from the
Pakistan Army, and a Pakistani mind nurtured by the textbook narrative of 'enemy
at birth', Pakistan has signed a liberal visa protocol with India that will be
transformational for the region, not so much for India as for Pakistan, if it is
implemented.“ In view of some, this transformation may – or may not – lead
to normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations, but could well lead to what can be
termed as normalization of Pakistan as a state. This means that for the first
time, both the liberal and (some) conservative elements of Pakistan are on the
same page. Nonetheless, there has been resistance: independent television
media, the Defense of Pakistan Council, representatives of the Jamaat i
Islami and some retired military personnel see visa and trade liberalization
as the slippery slope towards Pakistan’s “final
subordination to
the joint enemy of the US and India.”[6]
The fact
that there are new actors with a stake in the peace process is all to the good.
In 1991, Stephen P. Cohen
wrote,
“India cannot make peace, Pakistan cannot make war.” However, in 2013, both can
make trade, and permanent peace may follow. Small but promising steps towards
normalization between India and Pakistan have implications beyond their
bilateral relations, given the challenging neighbor-hood the two states inhabit.
With
AF-PAK scenario, Pakistan is a critical player for outcomes in Afghanistan,
though (the much-hated drone attacks, provoke strongly negative, anti-U.S.
reactions across Pakistan and constitute a major irritant in this bilateral
relationship with U.S. Nonetheless, President-Obama is likely to seek
Pakistan’s maximum cooperation for troop withdrawal from Afghanistan – at least
till 2014 – and Pakistan’s future government must make positive advances towards
Obama administration. However, subsequent to elections in Pakistan in 2013, this
situation should dramatically change and geared in a positive direction. For
example, Imran Khan’s Tehreek e Insaaf party has pledged to end drone
attacks, which is undoubtedly a strong populist stance, and now must invoke
positive reactions from Washington and Pakistan both.
The U.S. -
Pakistani relationship remains schizophrenic and strained and both nations must
overcome this malady. The U.S. has disbursed billions in various forms of aid to
Islamabad over the past decade. Yet, the two countries remain at odds over
Afghanistan, where based on the assessment of the western experts, the two
countries are in fact “fighting a proxy war.” Pakistan’s intelligence agency,
the ISI, has long been charged with sheltering the Taliban leadership,
supporting militant fighters and providing “indispensable” support to the
insurgency in Afghanistan – a strategy that some attribute to Pakistan hedging
its bets on Afghanistan outcomes post-2014. On the other hand, the U.S. persists
with continuing the drone war, despite the explicit request of the Pakistani
parliament and foreign ministry that they cease flying, viewing them as an
infringement of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The coming transition in Afghanistan
from NATO to Afghan leadership in the war in 2014 will be a major challenge for
American-Pakistani relations, with major implications for India. A key supporter
and largest provider of aid to Kabul, seeking to fill the United States’ shoes
in security and training for Afghan forces. India may well become the Northern
Alliance’s main ally in a post 2014-Afghanistan. If so, an American-Pakistan
“proxy war” could become an Indo-Pakistan proxy war, instead and must be avoided
at all costs by all sides.
Besides
all this, the Middle East is the key factor in formalizing a truly changed and
effective U.S.-Pakistan relationship through U.S policy change. The
achievement of peace between Israel and Palestine could be a tremendous total
game-changer in the achievement “from great game to great gain” mentioned
above for Pakistan, Afghanistan, India the entire region and the world at
large, as well as for the two countries most directly concerned, for the Muslim
world as a whole, and for Iran. The West tends to seriously underestimate the
depth of the strong emotional and negative impact of the unresolved Palestinian
conflict on the rest of the Muslim world’s geo-political relationships. Obama
Administration has clearly stated that he will make progress on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict a diplomatic priority from day one, working towards
the goal of two states, living side-by-side in peace and security. If he can
pull that off, not only will his name go down in history, but also the effects
elsewhere in the Muslim world, including Pakistan, and in South Asia, could be
transformational globally. If it is true, then peace may have yet another and
outstanding chance.
References:
[1] Prof Michel
Chossudovsky, “9/11 AND AMERICA’S “WAR ON TERRORISM”, a critical research on
9/11-an important book by Global Research, May, 2011. Also Peter Dale Scott,
“The Road to 9/11” September, 2007
[2]
Mustafa Akyol ,Islam
without Extremes:
AMuslim Case for Liberty (W.W.Norton & Co, published July-2011)
[3] http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/a/arnold_j_toynbee.html#
Go6G3hivRO2Lx5by.9
[4]Bruce K. Rutherford,
Egypt after Mubarak:
Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (2008 Princeton University
Press). [4-a]Raymond William Baker,
Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists…Harvard
University Press, 2006.
[4-b]
Yasemin Ergin
April 16, 2012,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/turkey/120411/meet-the-people-behind-turkeys-economic-miracle.
(The
rise of the 'Anatolian Tigers' has changed the balance of power in Turkey’s
economy.)
[5]
Barnett R. Rubin
and
Ahmed Rashid,
From
Great Game to Grand Bargain:
Ending Chaos in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Foreign Affairs,
November/December 2008.
[6] Khaled Ahmed, A
breakthrough with India? The Friday Times September 14-20, 2012 - Vol. XXIV, No.
31